Efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention. The implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs. The results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient, given the political power of interest groups.
Governmental intervention in farm commodity markets often has been evaluated using analytical procedures developed by Nerlove and Wallace to measure deadweight losses. These losses are the costs of obtaining various social and political objectives. The view in this paper is that the central purpose of intervention is to redistribute income to producers from consumers or taxpayers. In this context, the social cost of intervention is the deadweight loss per dollar transferred. This general view is not novel (Dardis, Josling) . The purpose here is to treat it more systematically than previously.
The main innovation in this paper is to tie deadweight losses based on consumers' and producers' surpluses explicitly to surplus transfers. This can be important. Consider a particular example: a market with linear supply and demand curves of equal slope. In this situation, the standard approach holds that a production-control program to achieve price P Parts of this material have been presented in seminars at the Universities of Chicago, Maryland, Purdue, Illinois, and Texas A&M.
The author is grateful for comments received from participants on these occasions, and from the AlAE reviewers.
weight losses of area e. Since e = b + c, the deadweight losses are equal and there is no way to choose between them on efficiency grounds [Wallace, p. 585, eq. (4) ]. However, the deadweight loss per dollar transferred to producers is quite different.
The amount transferred under the production control is the area a (price gain on output Qo) minus c (rents lost on Qe -Qo). The amount transferred with the deficiency payment is area a + b + d. The deadweight loss per dollar transferred with production control is equal to ej(a -c); for the payment program it is ej(a + b + d). Since the latter denominator is larger, the ratio is smaller-the deadweight loss ratio is smaller for the payment program. Thus, payments are a more efficient redistributive mechanism even though the standard triangles are equal for both programs.
Quantifying Efficiency in Redistribution
It would be useful to have formulas analogous to those developed by Nerlove and Wallace, but specified to measure efficiency in redistribution. To visualize what is measured by such formulas, a graphical approach can illustrate the tradeoff between consumers' and producers' surpluses (Josling 1974) . This surplus transformation curve is analogous to the economy-wide constraint on income redistribution which Bator calls the utility possibilities frontier. (10)
which is equation (5) for the linear case.
An example of equation (10) is shown in figure 2 as the solid curve to the left of point E, attained when Q = Qe' It is analogous to Bator's endowment point. For given supply and demand curves, E results in the maximum sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses. At this point the marginal rate of transformation between PSand CS is -1.
1
Intervention that favors producers generates points to the left of E. The maximum producers' surplus is obtained at pointM. This reflects monopoly production [confirm by differentiating (10) with respect to CS and equating it to zero]. Thus, intervention favoring producers yields points between E and M on the surplus transformation curve, such as R. At this point consumers lose dCS and producers gain MS.
Efficiency at the margin is measured by the slope of the surplus transformation curve. If it is -1, then a dollar given up by consumers yields a dollar gained by producers. This could occur (theoretically) through a lump-sum transfer but not market intervention. The greater the slope's departure from -1, the less efficient the redistribution. The general expression for the slope is obtained from equations (3) and (4) as
For an intuitive grasp of this slope's determinants, consider the cases of linear and constant-elasticity (log-linear) demand and supply curves. For the linear case, differentiate equation (10) with respect to PS using equation (8) to replace CS, and substitute
The slope is negative for Q between Qe and Qm' the output that maximizes PS. It increases from -1 at Qe to 0 at o: Thus, the marginal efficiency of redistribution depends on the
(1) Let redistribution from consumers to producers occur through production controls. Such intervention results in output Q, which is less than or equal to the unregulated competitive output, Qe ' The resulting consumer and producer surpluses (CS and PS, respectively) are defined as
The surpluses with production controls are
The surplus transformation curve is. obtained by solving (8) for Qand substituting in (9), to obtain 
where B = 1 + (lIe) and C = 1 + (l/1])· sible to redistribute much surplus to producers. This occurs because PSis equal to total revenue and the elasticity of demand is only a little less than 1. For elastic demand curves at E, producers' surplus is reduced by output control when supply is perfectly inelastic. Fixed supply can generate comer solutions at E. The slope of the transformation curve at E is not -1 when b,~00. Generally, there will be corners in the surplus transformation curve if output restriction is capable of driving supply price to zero.
These are the same qualitative results derived by Wallace. However, we can estimate more readily how sensitive marginal deadweight losses per dollar redistributed are to changes in supply and demand parameters. Note that by setting the derivatives of (11) Rosine and Helmberger estimated that in 1970 $4,829 million was distributed away from consumers and taxpayers in order to give farmers $2,140 million. This implies that MSI dCS = .44, but it does not provide an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution (dPSI dCS) at the restricted equilibrium point.
Analytically, the total redistribution to producers in the linear case is where R = QeIQ.
Total redistribution in the constant-elasticity case is (15) MS CS supply and demand slopes and the extent of production cutback.
For log-linear supply and demand curves, the slope of the surplus transformation curve is demand (a negative number) and e the elasticity of supply. The effect of an increase in e is to make the first term of (13), which is always positive, smaller. Therefore, the slope of the surplus transformation curve, for any given restriction Q, becomes closer to -1. This means that the marginal deadweight loss per dollar transferred (the "price of redistribution") is reduced. The effect of an absolute increase in 11 is to make the first term of (13) larger. Consequently, the marginal deadweight loss per dollar transferred is increased. Thus, the social cost of redistribution to producers is reduced by a lower demand elasticity or a higher supply elasticity. Figure 2 shows the effect of a change in supply elasticity for the linear case from perfectly elastic tb, = 0) to perfectly inelastic (b I~0 0). Equations (11) to (13) each imply that the slope is more sensitive to a change in supply elasticity, the more elastic is the demand function. Note that when b,~00 (perfectly inelastic supply) in figure 2, it is impos-An example will clarify these formulas and their relationship to the Nerlove/Wallace results. Suppose a commodity has (constant) elasticities of demand and supply of'YJ = -0.5 and E = 0.2, respectively, and that a production-control program reduces output by 20% (R = Qe/Q = 1.25). Applying formula (15), besides being exact for constant elasticities, is that it ties deadweight losses explicitly to surplus redistribution. The contribution of equation (13), which has no parallel in the Nerlove/Wallace treatment, is to show the marginal costs of further redistribution. In the present example, dPS/dCS = -.60. Thus, at the margin, a dollar transferred from consumers results in a 60¢ gain for producers and a 40~deadweight loss. A marginal rate of surplus transformation less than the total gain in PS per dollar of CS lost is a quite general result. It follows from the convexity of the surplus transformation curve.
Redistribution toward Consumers
An extension of the surplus transformation curve to the right of point E involves intervention to redistribute income from producers to consumers. The mechanism could be a price ceiling below the unregulated market price. Then equations (3) and (4) become
where Q is .output forthcoming at the ceiling price, S(~). The surplus transformation curve for a linear example is to the right of point E in figure 2. It also has a slope of -1 at point E. The maximum consumers' surplus is at point N, the monopsony outcome. Equilib-ria favoring consumers lie between points E andN.
The producer-and consumer-favoring surplus transformation curves meet with equal slope at point E. They form a continuous, smooth function describing all surplusdistributing possibilities available by ouputrestricting intervention. The vertical (or horizontal) difference between the surplus transformation curve and its tangent at point E measures the deadweight loss from redistribution. Note that the deadweight loss accelerates with the extent of intervention in either direction from E.
Deficiency Payments
There may be more efficient ways of redistributing surpluses than output restriction. In this context, "more efficient" means capable of generating a larger sum of surpluses for a given PS/CS ratio. An intervention mechanism that has been used for some agricultural commodities is to guarantee a "target" price to produce greater than Pi. Payments equal to the difference between the target price and the market-clearing price are made. This approach, equivalent to a subsidy, increases both producers' and consumers' surpluses. But it adds costs to taxpayers who provide the payments, creating a three-group redistribution that defeats graphics like figure 2. It also introduces deadweight losses from additional taxes.
Consider consumers/taxpayers as a single group. They are, of course, the same set of people, but individuals differ in their Patio of food expenditure to tax payments. So there may be significant redistribution within the group if intervention changes from production-control to deficiency payments. This is especially important because the ratio of tax payments to food expenditures changes across income classes, rising from near zero at the lowest incomes to well over one at higher incomes. In this paper, however, taxpayer costs will be subtracted from consumers' surplus to obtain a deficiency-payment income redistribution curve from consumers/taxpayers to producers. The relevant calculation of consumers' surplus plus taxpayers' costs, T, is obtained from equation (16). Producers' surplus comes from equation (17) 
These imply the transformation curve, Figure 3 compares the surplus transformation curve from figure 2 with that for equation (20), using the same supply and demand functions. The lower dotted curve running northwest from point E shows the trade-off between producers' surplus and consumers' surplus minus taxpayers costs. Between points E and F the production-control approach is relatively efficient, but to the left of F deficiency payments are more efficient. The dott~d transformation curve could be extended nghtward from point E to generate redistribution favoring consumers. This might involve an all-ornone offer to producers to produce output Q '(>Qe) to be sold at a regulated price p' (<P e ) . This approach conceivably could be used to redistribute essentially all the producers' surplus to consumers, with relatively small deadweight loss. Stalinist delivery quotas at state-specified prices could approximate such a policy.
With constant elasticities, the slope of the transformation curve for a subsidy generating output Q > Qe is (21) is similar to (13) except for the parameter T. This parameter is the deadweight loss associated with market distortion when taxes are imposed in order to raise funds for the deficiency payments. This loss is external to the regulated commodity market. It might be approximated by marginal deadweight losses per dollar of federal income tax. If this were negligible, then T could be taken as zero. However, this loss is not negligible (Harberger, Layard). Moreover, even if the deadweight loss per dollar of additional taxes is no more than 15~at the margin, as suggested by Harberger, the cost per dollar transferred to producers is likely to be substantially greate~. The reason is that part of the tax revenue IS distributed back to consumers through lower prices. The net effectiveness of deficiency payments to producers depends on the supply and demand elasticities. 
Comparative Redistribution EfficiencyProduction Controls versus Payments
Comparing equation (21) with (13) indicates that the relative size of the demand and supply elasticities determines whether a deficiency es-t . 1· t payment or production.. contro IS m?s Figure 3 . Surplus transformation curves for efficient. But exact condItIOn~for prefem~g production control and subsidy one or the other are not ObVIOUS. Wallace S result that deadweight losses are the same when the supply and demand elasticities are equal does not hold. However, while the deadweight loss per dollar transferred is greater for the production control with equal elasticities, this advantage of deficiency payments may be offset by added social cost of raising taxes to finance the payments.? A low demand elasticity or high supply elasticity tends to make production control the preferred alternative. Conversely, a low supply elasticity or a high demand elasticity favors deficiency payments. But the effect is not symmetrical, the demand elasticity being a more important determinant of efficiency for production controls and the supply elasticity more important for deficiency payments.
For linear supply and demand curves, it is even more obvious that there is no simple, general rule for tying supply and demand slopes to efficiency. This is illustrated by the crossing of the solid and dashed transformation curves in figure 3. Note also that in the limiting case in which supply is perfectly elastic, deficiency payment can generate no producers' surplus, so production control should always be chosen to aid producers. The transformation curve for deficiency payments is a horizontal line whose length measures the deadweight loss of taxpayer costs over consumers' surplus gains. If supply is perfectly inelastic a subsidy should be chosen, unless the deadweight loss per dollar raised in taxes exceeds 1111. The qualification is needed because if e = 0, the benefits of deficiency payments go entirely to producers. Therefore, V' = Tin equation (22), and dPSjdCS = -1 + T. For production controls we have dPSj dCS = -(11 + 1). Therefore, in order for production controls to be more efficient than the subsidy, 1111 must be less than T (0.15 in the figure 3 example).
In general, the efficient form of intervention is determined by equations (13) and (21) for specific values of e, 11, T, and OJQe'
Redistribution with International Trade
Consider the difference it makes for efficient redistribution if the product is exported. Assuming that foreigners have no political power 2 A reviewer points out that there are administrative costs of production controls that should be taken into account; and there are also administrative costs of payment distribution. albeit probably smaller per dollar transferred than the administrative costs of production controls.
in the United States, their consumers' surplus is ignored. The surplus transformation curves of figure 4 are derived from linear supply and demand curves with own-price elasticities at free-market equilibrium of -.88 for domestic demand, -3.5 for export demand, and 1.75 for supply. E' is the market equilibrium without intervention. Production controls generate the solid surplus transformation curve northwest from E', The sum of producers' surplus and domestic consumers' surplus is no longer maximized at market equilibrium, but at point R. Thus, production controls may be chosen to maximize the sum of surpluses, whereas this could only have been accomplished by laissez-faire in figure 2 or 3.
In the example shown, a deficiency payment program is less efficient in redistributing income, indicated by the upper dotted transformation curve, in figure 4. This is because the lower market prices resulting from payments transfer income to foreign consumers, while production controls transfer income away from them. However, if the demand for exports is sufficiently elastic, this result is reversed, with deficiency payments more efficient. In such cases there is no longer a gain in the sum of surpluses from intervention. The extreme case is the small-country case of perfectly elastic export demand at the world price. In this case, production controls leave price unchanged and reduce producers' surplus, while deficiency payments result in deadweight losses smaller than in figure 4.
Trade opens up possibilities for new forms of raising taxes to pay the subsidy must be added to the shaded triangle, but this cannot make an export subsidy more efficient than deficiency payments.) If export demand is not perfectly elastic then the efficiency of export subsidies (and deficiency payments) is further reduced because transfers to foreign consumers will occur. The reason is shown in figure 6 . Suppose we want producers to have rents attained at P.
This can be achieved with a deficiency payment of P -Pt. Domestic and foreign consumers both pay Pi, and the deadweight loss is the shaded area. If the same producer price is achieved by an export subsidy, domestic consumers will pay P. This reduces total demand at all (export) prices below Pby the horizontal difference between the domestic demand curve and o: yielding the dashed total demand curve. Now it requires a larger subsidy of intervention. Export quotas (or equivalent export taxes) redistribute income to consumers, shown in figure 4 by the solid surplus transformation curve southeast from E'. The sum of surpluses is increased by intervention, reaching a maximum at T, because there is redistribution away from foreign consumers. But the U.S. gainers are now consumers.' In such situations, production controls (favoring producers) and export controls (favoring consumers) could yield the same marginal rate of surplus transformation, with a sum of surpluses higher than the free-market equilibrium. Thus, it could be rational to switch, as in the 1970s, quite suddenly from controlling production via "set-asides" to export controls as supply/demand conditions change.
Export subsidies are harder to justify. The surplus transformation curve for an export subsidy is the lower dotted curve in figure 4. An export subsidy necessarily causes a greater domestic deadweight loss than a deficiency payment program, while the latter is less efficient than production controls. It is possible that, with domestic demand less elastic than export demand, price discrimination with export subsidies may be an efficient way to redistribute income to producers, but not as efficient as a domestic price floor plus deficiency payments.
Consider the most favorable circumstances for an export subsidy, a perfectly elastic demand function for exports, figure 5. Production controls are not useful because they reduce producers' surplus and leave price unchanged. However, a price floor for domestic consumption, or a tax on processors which is refunded to producers could be a relatively efficient transfer mechanism. A domestic price at P d would redistribute (P d -P w ) o: with the deadweight loss of the hatched triangle. An export subsidy of s per unit would redistribute an additional amount s(Qs -Qd) to producers at the cost of the smaller shaded triangle. However, a deficiency payment program would transfer s Qs to producers for the same deadweight loss. Efficiency in redistribution occurs at domestic price Pd and subsidy s at which the marginal rate of deadweight loss per dollar transferred is the same for both the domestic price floor and the production subsidy. (To be complete, the deadweight losses per bushel, P -P 2 , to boost total demand to Q. The deadweight loss is increased by the hatched areas. In figure 5 , with export demand perfectly elastic at the world price, deadweight losses below P, disappear.
Export subsidies might be efficient in adjusting to past policy "mistakes." A commodity's support price may lead to an unanticipated buildup of stocks. The stocks may have sufficiently high storage costs that receiving even, say, half the support price for them would reduce taxpayers' costs. In these circumstances, an export subsidy may be efficient. However, domestic consumption subsidies and a move toward production controls also should occur, since these are more efficient adjustment mechanisms.
Use and Limitations
The formulas of this paper can be used in two related but distinct ways, one normative and one positive. The positive application is to explore whether policy variations over time and across commodities can be explained in terms of efficiency in redistribution. For example, does the move from production controls to direct payments in cotton and rice during the 1970s reflect changes in efficiency resulting from changes in supply or demand elasticities? Can the general absence of production-control programs for livestock products be explained in terms of efficiency with relatively high demand elasticities?
The normative application is to rank prospective programs for redistributing income. Suppose, for example, that it is the intention of Congress to increase peanut growers' incomes. How should this be accomplished, and what is the marginal cost of alternative redistribution levels? The best available analysis of alternative peanut programs is Nieuwoudt, Bullock, and Mathia. Their work implies an aggregate elasticity of demand for U.S. peanuts of -1.8 and an elasticity of supply of about 4.0. U.S. policy under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 involves marketing controls and acreage allotments and so is basically a production-control approach." But there have been continuing proposals, most recently by the Reagan administration early in 1981, to replace this program by a deficiency payment (subsidy) approach. Using the elasticities of -1.8 and +4.0, equations (13) and (21) imply a marginal rate of transformation of -.74 for a production-control and -.27 for a subsidy program, with a 20% quantity reduction or increase. This rough calculation indicates that it is relatively efficient to intervene with marketing controls and that the conclusion of Nieuwoudt, Bullock, and Mathia that "the target price plan would greatly reduce treasury and social costs" (p. 65) is wrong.
A serious limitation of the application just outlined, and of any use of the formulas developed, is that most commodity programs are not simply production-control or payment programs. Often they combine elements of each. However, complex schemes can be simulated for particular values of intervention variables given the values of key behavioral elasticities (or derivatives), and expectations of what such simulations would show can often be deduced from results in the simpler models. For example, the fact that inelastic demand makes production controls efficient relative to deficiency payments suggests that a higher price in the relatively inelastic fluid milk market is a means of reducing the deadweight loss per dollar transferred to dairy producers. ' Further limitations arise when commodity markets are interdependent. For example, the supply of soybeans, given the price of com, is expected to be quite elastic. If intervention is to be undertaken to aid com producers specifically (as it has been), because of the high supply elasticity, quantity controls should be more efficient than deficiency payments. The same would be true for soybeans. Yet, if we take corn and soybeans jointly, we have an aggregate commodity substantially less elastic in supply. This suggests that more efficient redistribution might result from intervention of the payment type for both products simultaneously ..Indeed, extension of this reasoning suggests the most efficient method of redis-Concluding Remarks and Summary the political process. Political behavior may involve a bargaining game among interest groups (as in Zusman and Amiad) or a "policy preference function" (Rausser and Freebairn) . Becker, in his analysis of the positive economics of redistribution, discusses in detail the properties of the behavioral function that replaces the social welfare function. In this context, We and W p represent' the (marginal) political power of consumers and producers. Thus, a point such as R in figure 2 is a political equilibrium in which the political power of producers exceeds that of consumers. The efficient redistribution hypothesis is that the political process places us at points like R, at which resources are used as efficiently as possible given the political preference function. (24) tributing income to farmers generally might be subsidies applicable to any crop.
Sector-wide intervention implies that the relevant interest group is farmers in total, not splintered commodity groups. Interaction between commodity markets has implications for the formation of political coalitions among commodity groups. The greater the cross elasticities of supply or demand between two commodities, the greater the difference between the partial and total elasticities of supply or demand, and the greater the efficiency gain in income redistribution from a program to protect both commodities jointly. Thus, apart from the political and economic factors that bear on producers' ability to form coalitions, one might expect that coalitions will be more prevalent among closely related commodities because the deadweight losses from intervention are reduced more by joint intervention under these circumstances.
In standard welfare economics the policy optimum is found with a social welfare function, The deadweight losses caused by governmental intervention in agricultural commodity markets do not tell the whole story about such intervention, nor is desire to redistribute income the sole reason for intervention. Under the assumption that it is an important reason, the deadweight losses can be viewed as a price paid to redistribute through market intervention. This paper develops models for estimating this price-the deadweight loss per dollar redistributed. It also derives for productioncontrol and deficiency-payment programs the relationship between this price and its determinants-supply and demand elasticities, the extent of intervention, and the deadweight loss from raising general tax revenues. Qualitative results are also obtained for intervention when the export market is important.
In general, redistributive efficiency increases as either the supply or the demand function becomes less elastic. The efficient method of intervention depends on which function is less whereW p and We are the marginal contribu-elastic. Inelastic demand favors production tions of producers' and consumers' surpluses controls, and inelastic supply a deficiency to the social welfare function. The policy op-payment approach. If demand is inelastic timum is a point of tangency between a social enough, less than about -0.15 in the cases welfare indifference curve and the highest at-considered in this paper, production controls tainable surplus transformation curve. With are more efficient even than lump sum transequal weights on the utilities of consumers and fers to producers. This is because of deadproducers, the policy optimum is the market weight losses associated with the taxes necesequilibrium.
sary for payments. The social welfare function is a normative For intervention with an exported product, concept. The comparable non-normative con-it is shown that deficiency payments are gencept is a representation of how producers' and, erally preferable to an export subsidy. Yet if consumers' well-being is actually regarded in the exporter is not a price taker in world mar- where UP and UC are the aggregate utilities of producers and consumers. Redistributional intervention in a commodity market involves changes in (23) via a regulatory variable, X, such as a level of controlled output, a price floor, or payment per bushel. Changes in UP and UC resulting from a change inX are taken to be changes in producer and consumer surpluses, following Harberger. Therefore, the policy optimum can be found by replacing UP and UC by PS and CS, then differentiating (23) with respect to X and equating to zero, which yields
at University of Victoria on October 8, 2012
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from kets, production controls may be more efficient than either type of subsidy. Moreover, under shifting economic conditions or political power, it may be efficient to shift between production controls (favoring producers) and export controls (favoring consumers).
The usefulness of the exact results generated by the formulas developed in the paper depends on having reliable estimates of supply and demand elasticities. These are often lacking. Nonetheless, it may still be of value to know exactly how much difference it makes for efficiency in distribution if the supply elasticity, say, is Y2 or 1Y2. And the formulas can also be informative about the value of better information on elasticities. If costs of redistribution are sensitive to potential error in elasticities, it will be worthwhile to make the econometric effort necessary to sharpen our estimates. And if data do not permit accurate estimation, we can at least assess more exactly the range of likely errors in our redistributive analyses.
[Received October 1981 ,. revision accepted September 1982 
